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ABSTRACT

Arguing that state and local political issue campaigns warrant increased attention from communication scholars, this paper presents a rationale for analysis of issue campaigns, develops a framework for organizing and analyzing such campaigns, and applies the framework to an analysis of the 1986 campaign for the sale of liquor "by the drink" (no packaged liquor sold) in Kansas. Following a brief introduction and discussion of campaign issues as opposed to images, the paper provides a descriptive analysis of the stages and functions of communication in issue campaigns resulting in direct balloting by voters. It then looks at communication functions in issue campaigns, specifically addressing the functions of education, trust development, development of a positive message, and the neutralization of the opposition. The remainder of the paper is devoted to a detailed case study of the Kansas campaign for liquor by the drink in which the various communication functions are emphasized. After outlining the history of liquor laws in the state, the paper reviews communication in the preballot approval stage of the campaign, the ballot approval stage, and the election. In addition to extensive notes, the paper also includes a variety of materials used in the case study analysis, including a copy of a speech by the governor of the state in favor of the issue and copies of materials used by proponents of the issue. (FL)

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The Stages and Functions of Communication in Ballot Issue Campaigns: A Case Study of the Kansas Campaign for Liquor by the Drink

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In the 1986 elections, voters in 43 states cast ballots to determine the outcome of 226 statewide ballot proposals. Ranging from traditional issues, such as bonds and taxes, to declaration of an official state language, many issues captured as much attention as candidate races. With the growing use of initiative and referendum by both state and local governments as well as the need for states to bring their constitutions into line with modern economic and social needs, citizens are playing a more direct role in shaping public policy.

In general, speech communication scholars tend to observe, analyze, and theorize about candidate races, especially at a national level, more than issue campaigns. Furthermore, when issues are analyzed, they tend to be national issues. The authors are of the opinion, however, that the state and local political arenas provide the political communication scholar with a wealth of potential research data. We are, in particular, convinced that the increased importance of issue ballots at the state and local levels warrants more attention from a communication perspective. Thus, it is the purpose of this paper to present a rationale for analysis of issue campaigns, to develop a framework for organizing and analyzing such campaigns, and to apply the framework to an analysis of the 1986 campaign for liquor by the drink in Kansas.

Issues vs. Images

Research on candidate campaigns by both communication and political science scholars has advanced the generally accepted conclusion that many candidate races are short on discussion of the issues. Creation of image, particularly of leadership qualities, dominates campaign messages. Bennett suggests that

> it should come as no surprise to politicians and political analysts that American national elections are not forums in

> which serious political issues are resolved. Moreover, campaign statements and promises are notoriously poor predictors of policies and programs in the forthcoming administration. Even if the candidates intended their positions on the issues to reflect serious commitments to principles, policies, and priorities, it would be an analytical mistake to take campaign discourse at face value.[1]

As a result of this phenomenon, Bennett further concludes that "national elections are neither equipped nor intended to perform as a policy-making forum in the American context."[2] What ultimately takes place in a campaign is that voters "are in fact judging the character and the general trustworthiness of those who tell us what 'the issues' are."[3]

Both Swanson and O'Keefe and Sheinkopf attribute the image over issues phenomenon of American political campaigns to the news media and the manner in which they report campaign events.[4]

Swanson observes that due to the need for network news reports to reduce an entire day's activities into a few minutes as well as to entertain to ensure ratings, drama is the key to campaign reporting:

> The 'Melodramatic Imperative' thus emerges as a frame of reference for reporting campaigns which neatly satisfies the requirements of television. This frame of reference allows reporters to translate complex events and personalities into a simple and familiar scenario.[5]

Thus, little substantive information is shared with television viewers.

O'Keefe and Sheinkopf reached a similar conclusion in their examination of television advertising in the 1972 presidential campaign and its effects on voters' knowledge on the issues. They concluded that "voters were not very knowledgeable about the campaign . . . . Image over issue was clearly supported."[6]

Ivie further explains the image over issues approach as a result of the fact that

> Candidates must remain sufficiently orthodox and ambiguous on the issues to earn the support of a majority among the

> multitude of competing interest groups . . . . successful candidates generally reserve their explicit statements of opinion on volatile questions for presentation to homogeneous and sympathetic audiences under circumstances that reduce access of the news media.[7]

While candidate research both confirms and accepts that images predominate campaigns, the same cannot be said of issue campaigns. By their very nature, such campaigns necessitate discussion of "the issues." Even when emotional issues are involved in ballot campaigns, rhetors cannot escape discussion of the relationship between societal values and policy impacts as evidenced by analysis of gay rights referenda[8] and abortion law controversy.[9]

Because images rather than issues predominate messages in candidate campaigns, there is little theoretical grounding regarding issue development in candidate campaign research that is applicable to ballot issue campaigns. Furthermore, the number of communication studies specifically dealing with issues involving direct voter participation appear to be limited based on a review of articles listed in indexes to communication journals. Two studies, Wall and McCain[10] and Medhurst[11] provide some bases for analysis. Wall and McCain examined the information diffusion process in a school bond proposal, and Medhurst explored rhetorical strategies employed by anti-gay rights activists in a gay rights referendum vote.

Most other speech communication research on issues examines them in terms of office holders' or candidates' handling of issues[12] or from the perspective of movements, social dramas, or argumentation fields.[13] More generalized works on political communication, such as Nimmo's *Political Communication and Public Opinion in America*,[14] provide an excellent synthesis of research in political science, communication, and mass communication as they apply to the political process. However, when general theory is applied, it tends to be in the narrow range previously identified.

One recent article showing a change in the trend is Schuetz's analysis of arguments within the legislative process.[15] Schuetz identifies "species" of arguments "according to their function, form, language, and audience."[16] This approach provides considerable insight into the nature of issue arguments. However, it is limited to an examination of the public as participants in influencing legislators on the issues and cannot be applied to the transactional nature of argument in ballot issue campaigns.

While all of the approaches described are helpful in understanding the application of rhetorical theory to a wide variety of political communication events, they do not provide a pragmatic framework for analysis of strategies involved in issue campaigns taken directly to the voters. For those seeking a generalized analysis of communication strategies applicable to development of issue campaigns, a new approach is needed. This paper attempts to fill that void by providing a descriptive analysis of the stages and functions of communication in issue campaigns resulting in direct balloting by voters. The research is based on the authors' involvement in or study of over one dozen such campaigns. Research on stages and communication functions of candidate campaigns as well as persuasion theory serve as theoretical bases for the analysis.

The Stages of an Issues Campaign

Just as candidate campaigns can be said to pass through "relatively discrete stages, which can be categorized as preprimary, primary, convention, and general election"[17], issue campaigns are also waged through a series of stages. We will label these stages as pre-ballot approval, ballot approval, and election.

The pre-ballot approval stage is similar to the surfacing stage in a candidate campaign. During this stage of an issue campaign, proponents gauge support, begin fundraising, and establish an organizational structure to get an issue on the ballot. Once proponents give public signals of their intent to take an

issue to the people, opponents mobilize in a similar fashion either to prevent the issue from getting on a ballot or to begin the campaign to ensure its defeat at the polls or a combination of both.

The timing and length of the pre-ballot approval is determined in large measure by the familiarity of citizens or policy makers with an issue as well as with statutory requirements affecting the process. On the state level, 17 states have an initiative procedure for putting constitutional amendments on the ballot, 21 states have initiative provisions for state legislation, and 37 states have referendum provisions for state legislation.[16]

At the local level, there is a wide variety of initiative and referendum procedures as well as procedures whereby governing bodies can submit proposals to voters. In the case of constitutional issues, states without initiative procedures employ the legislative process as a means of putting amendments before the voters. Timing and length of pre-ballot strategies may be determined in part by whether or not special elections are used for approving measures or if some issues, such as constitutional changes, can be voted on only during regular election years. In states where constitutional issues must go through a legislative process and are voted on during regular elections, the pre-ballot approval stage can begin as far in advance as two years before the election.

The ballot approval stage corresponds to the primary in a candidate campaign. Citizens employing initiative and referendum options must obtain sufficient signatures to place an issue on the ballot. Those issues requiring a vote of city commissioners, county commissioners, or state legislators to secure a place on the ballot must garner sufficient votes within the policy-making body. Opponents are equally active during this stage, especially when lobbying of policy makers can possibly prevent submission of an issue to the voters. Thus, timing and duration are factors of statutory requirements as well as the nature and com-

plexity of the issue.

The final stage, the election, occurs only if proponents succeed in petition drives or in gaining policy makers' approval. In this stage, the issue is taken to the voters and both proponent and opponent campaigns are waged. This stage can be longer or shorter than either or both of the other stages. In the case study presented in this paper, the final stage lasted 18 months while the first lasted approximately six and the second lasted three months. In the case of several other constitutional amendments appearing on the 1986 Kansas ballot, the length of time between legislative approval and the citizens' vote was less than four months. In some instances, depending upon the statutory requirements, all three stages can be accomplished in three or four months.

Within each of these stages, both proponents and opponents employ a wide variety of communication strategies to achieve their goals. An explanation of those tactics is given in the next section.

Communication Functions in Issues Campaigns

Communication functions for candidate campaigns are generally divided into two categories: pragmatic and ritualistic. While the nature of issue campaigns necessitates that most communication be pragmatic, there is a place for ritualistic functions, particularly if the rhetor holds public office and uses the office as a means of campaigning for an issue. The context in which communication takes place also affects the ritualistic nature of the message.

It is also important to note that in some stages of an issue campaign, private, rather than public, communication is more effective as a persuasive device. Carlin has observed that when public officials are directly involved in issue campaigns, private forums are often used prior to public forums or in place of them.[19]

While communication researchers study the public dimension of political com-

munication more than the private because of accessibility to information about the former, the dimension of interpersonal persuasion is an important one in political communication. Kaid observed that

> Communications researchers and attitude change theorists have long recognized the importance of communication between and among people in face-to-face situations. Political and social scientists, who have done much more work in the assessment of personal contact on voting behavior than have speech-communication scholars, have also found considerable evidence that interpersonal communication in the form of discussions with others, talks with family and friends, and political party canvassing can have a positive effect on voting intentions and turnout.[20]

Because many of the communication activities in the early stages of planning an issue campaign and in the legislative process involve non-public discourse, the interpersonal dimension of persuasion is an important one to consider in an analysis of communication strategies employed in issue campaigns because of two features of such persuasive strategies as explained by Smith

> interpersonal persuasion emphasizes people's active participation in social influence processes, with self-influence strategies predominating. Second, interpersonal persuasion operates on the assumption that people are goal-directed agents, always striving to maximize rewards and avoid punishments.[21]

Regardless of whether persuasive strategies are public or private, they serve a specific function within the overall structure of the campaign. Trent and Friedenberg identify unique functions for each of the four stages of candidate campaigns. However, it is our contention that communication strategies employed by successful advocates in issue campaigns serve four primary functions regardless of the stage in the campaign. The four functions as we have identified them are: (1) education; (2) trust development; (3) development of a positive message; and (4) neutralization of the opposition. Functions may occur simultaneously or have

some overlap; however, the order used to list the functions in no way indicate distinct steps.

We further contend that these functions are applicable to either proponent or opponent campaigns. While many opponent campaigns differ from those of proponents in that they develop negative messages, we believe that opponent campaigns are often more successful if they also adopt a positive stance.

Research by Medhurst supports this argument. In analyzing the defeat of a gay rights amendment in Davis, California (a community that fit the demographics for cities that had passed such amendments), Medhurst found that opponents avoided the "notions of moral wrong, evil sin, corruption and degradation" all of which are characteristic of a " 'paranoid style' "[22] and instead waged their campaign on the more positive stance of defending First Amendment Rights.

An explanation of the four functions and typical rhetorical activities used for each follows. A description of the rhetorical activities employed in all three stages is included. Additionally, a distinction is made between public and private activities.

Education

Both proponents and opponents seek to educate voters regarding the salient points of the issue. On complex issues, especially, voters may not hold an opinion or may oppose the issue because of its complexity. Where taxes are involved, public opinion polls typically find a hard-core set of opponents simply because taxes are mentioned. In such cases, education is an even more important element in the campaign.

In the 1986 Kansas election, for example, voters made decisions on seven constitutional amendments. Three were highly complex. Two of the three dealt with tax issues and the third with state government participation in private sector internal improvements projects (i.e. infrastructure and economic development

projects). Less than three months prior to the vote on internal improvements, polls showed over 90 percent of the registered voters surveyed were unaware an amendment would appear on the August primary ballot. Fifty-nine percent were undecided as to how they would vote. After an intensive campaign in which education played a major role, the issue passed, receiving over 60 percent of the vote. A similar situation existed in the November election on the other two complex issues. Both ultimately passed with over 60 percent of the vote.

The importance of education is not limited, however, to complex issues. Even on emotional issues, such as the gay rights referendum in the Medhurst study, voter education strategies designed to redefine the nature of the issue were successful.

The educational process can involve any number of rhetorical activities, most of which serve instrumental rather than ritualistic functions. Rhetorical activities selected to fulfill the educational function emphasize explanation, definition, and clarification.

Among the strategies employed are analysis pieces by reporters usually examining both sides of the issue, speeches, fact-oriented advertising, letters to the editor, forums and debates, and voters' guides containing both pro and con analyses prepared either by non-partisan groups such as the League of Women Voters or by government entities.

Trust Development

Most groups on either side of an issue seek out allies. Organizations or individuals with perceived high credibility are sought out for endorsements. Advocates of a position, either pro or con, hope that by gaining the support of highly credible, respected individuals or groups they will gain the voters' trust. Using names or quotations from individuals or organizational leaders in campaign materials, securing editorial endorsements, and having opinion leaders speak on

behalf of an issue are all rhetorical activities used in trust development.

On many issues, especially complex ones, the use of opinion leaders is important. They lend credibility as well as assist with the education process. Research by Katz hypothesized that information from the media followed a "two-step flow of communication" in which opinion leaders in a community mediate information between the media and the general public.[23] Bem further explained the effect of opinion leaders on influencing policy change

> Opinion leaders do more than transmit information to the general population. They also help create and perpetuate the social norms of the community; that is, they serve as models who demonstrate which behaviors are appropriate and which attitudes are correct. Accordingly, the process of bringing about social change in a community is often analogous to the two-step flow of information in that the opinion leaders again provide the mediating link, which in this case is a link between an external force for change and a modification of the behaviors and attitudes of the community at large.[24]

Voters will often accept guidance from experts they perceive as knowledgeable in a field when making decisions about issue ballots; whereas, they might not be convinced to vote for a candidate just because the same expert has endorsed him or her. Most voters assume they can make their own decisions on candidates. From their perspective, it is generally a matter of judging who is more sincere and possesses better leadership qualities. With complex issues, however, voters may feel less confident of their abilities to sort out messages . As a result, they are more willing to vote for an issue because of the endorsement even if they never fully understand the nature of the issue.

The trust-building function of an issue campaign is often ritualistic. Press conferences are held to announce support from a group. Endorsements serve to legitimize a movement. Trust development ultimately assists a group in image

creation as well as in enlisting advocates who can assist in spreading the substantive message of the campaign.

Development of a Positive Message

Arguments either for or against an issue are typically developed from a positive perspective in successful issue campaigns. Advocates emphasize the advantages of either change or preservation of the status quo. Associating a "yes" vote with a positive result is a logical way to get voters to think about voting in favor of an issue. Likewise, the juxtaposition of a positive message with an appeal to vote no is a successful attention getter. In addition to using the obvious term "yes," there are countless other words such as "progress," "rights," "preservation," and "choice" which suggest a positive message to voters.

Bumper sticker slogans or spot commercials are rhetorical activities that capitalize on the positive image of a campaign. Wording of petitions as well as interpersonal appeals to policy makers can stress positive terms. Speeches and campaign literature both tend to capitalize on terms that promote a positive image.

The importance of a positive image in candidate campaigns is an area that is gaining increased interest among researchers with the growing use of negative campaigning. While little conclusive evidence exists linking negative campaigning and negative images to failure in candidate races, a 1972 study by Stewart lends some support to our claim that positive messages are more persuasive. Stewart found that voters judged candidates employing "mud-slinging" or negative campaign tactics to be "the opposite of a highly credible candidate: to be untrustworthy, dishonest, incompetent, unqualified, unlikeable, not self-confident, and immature"[25] and that such perceptions affect voters' decisions at the polls.[26]

Overall, the creation of a positive message serves both instrumental and ritualistic purposes. For those supporting an issue, the use of a positive term

is readily identified with a "yes" vote -- an instrumental function. Positive terms can also create a favorable image for those opposing an issue as gay rights opponents in Davis, California demonstrated. In using a positive approach, opponents demonstrate that they support an accepted community value or ideal through opposition to the ballot issue.

Neutralization of the Opposition

This is one of the more complex strategies in an issue campaign. It has both public and private dimensions. In terms of the public dimension, neutralization requires the use of two-sided arguments to diminish the effectiveness of opposing arguments. Persuasion research has shown that two-sided messages are preferable when an audience will also be exposed to the opposing side's arguments. In most issue campaigns, an opposition campaign is waged thus necessitating neutralization through such an approach. Traditional forms of advertising and speeches easily incorporate these strategies thus providing multiple opportunities for neutralization.

Neutralization can also be accomplished through recruitment of key people into the campaign, especially individuals or groups who might reasonably be associated with the opposition. For instance, developing coalitions of leaders from both political parties would serve to remove a partisan sense from a campaign.

On the private side, persuasive activities would be directed at reducing an opponent's involvement in an issue or in securing compromises. Many of the interpersonal strategies associated with the committee process and the behind-the-scenes lobbying efforts of legislators are aimed at neutralizing.

Thus, neutralization strategies incorporate traditional persuasive approaches that deny the strength of the opposing side's arguments as well as interpersonal strategies designed to minimize the role of an opponent.

The Campaign for Liquor by the Drink in Kansas

As a result of the August 5, 1986 primary election and the November 4, 1986 general election, Kansans voted to make sweeping changes in the state constitution. In the August primary election, voters approved amendments allowing the state to participate with the private sector in internal improvement projects and to allow local governments the option of granting a tax abatement to businesses. Proponents believed both amendments were necessary to supplement several major economic development initiatives passed by the 1986 legislature. In the November election, voters approved four of the five amendments placed before them. Three of the amendments were frequently referred to as the "sin amendments"--liquor by the drink, the lottery, and pari-mutuel gambling. All passed by receiving approximately 60 percent of the vote or more. The fourth amendment adopted was a complex property tax classification measure designed to reduce the burden of tax reappraisal for certain classes of taxpayers such as homeowners. It also received "yes" votes from over 60 percent of the voters.

The only amendment to go down in defeat was a technical, and somewhat inconsequential, amendment clarifying the roles of the legislature and the elected state board of education in making policy for the state's public schools. It is worth noting here that this issue was also complex and its intent not immediately clear to voters. It is worth noting that this amendment, unlike the other six, had no active proponents or opponents. Thus, little educational information was supplied to voters. The vacuum in information undoubtedly contributed to the amendment's failure.

While the six amendments that passed were all considered important in some ways to economic development efforts in a state suffering from downturns in its three major industries -- agriculture, oil, and aviation -- the liquor by the drink issue garnered the most attention from press and public alike because of

what it symbolized about a changing attitude in Kansas. Modernization and image were two words used by proponents of constitutional changes, and the liquor issue was the most visible, especially to outsiders, of a state historically determined to hold on to its past.

In securing passage of the six constitutional amendments identified with economic development, proponents utilized the communication strategies described in the previous section. Because of the high visibility of the liquor by the drink issue, we have chosen to use it as an example of how advocates representing either side in an issue campaign can approach the task of persuading voters to vote their way. Because one of the authors was a key player in the campaign and the other participated in preparation of messages, both are referred to in third person to simplify writing.

History of Liquor Laws in Kansas

In 1880 Kansas became the first state in the nation to adopt prohibition. Article 15, Section 10 of the constitution read: "The open saloon shall be and is forever prohibited." "Forever" turned out to be 106 years; however, during that time the controversial issue reared its head periodically.

Carry Nation, the best-known prohibitionist in Kansas found that it took more than a constitutional amendment to prevent Kansans from drinking. Nation swung her hatchet in bars across Kansas at the turn of the century before going on a nationwide campaign for prohibition. On January 29, 1919 (58 years to the day that Kansas became a state), the eighteenth amendment to the federal constitution brought prohibition to the rest of the country.

On December 5, 1933, the country admitted that the great experiment to control demon rum had failed, but Kansas continued to hold on to its self-imposed prohibition amendment. In 1934 voters rejected repeal of the amendment by a vote of 347,644 in favor and 436,688 in opposition. Carry Nation's ghost continued to

rule the state, and *Emporia Gazette* editor William Allen White was said to have proclaimed that "Kansans will vote dry so long as they can stagger to the polls" (this quotation has also been attributed to Will Rogers when the issue of liquor laws is raised in Oklahoma).

In 1948 a major victory was won by liquor proponents. The prohibition amendment was not repealed, but statutory provisions prohibiting manufacture, sale, and consumption of intoxicating liquor were repealed. What followed was a confusing set of state laws that moved the state progressively closer to liquor by the drink for its own residents.

In 1970 a constitutional amendment to repeal Article 15, Section 10 was presented to voters. Polls indicated that a majority of Kansans favored repeal. The amendment failed by 11,000 votes -- approximately one vote per polling booth. If voting machines in pro-liquor Wyandotte County, home of Kansas City, had functioned properly, the vote would have been closer or might have turned out differently.

Although efforts were made periodically to resurrect the issue, they were unsuccessful until 1986. Because a resolution to place an amendment on a ballot in Kansas requires a two-thirds vote of both houses of the legislature, it is more difficult to pass a resolution than a bill. The single issue lobbying forces representing the anti-liquor faction in the state historically had a strong influence on legislators when it came time for a vote.

By the time Kansans had the opportunity to vote in 1986, however, the issue was hardly a "wet" versus "dry" one. Between 1970 and 1986 Kansas progessively liberalized its drinking laws to the point where liquor by the drink could be purchased in private clubs. The problem in 1986 was a system that made drinks easily accessible to Kansans willing to purchase a club membership that was reciprocal with up to 250 establishments throughout the state but that prevented those

without a club card or out-of-state visitors from even dining in many of the state's restaurants.

Because of the confusion created for outsiders, many economic development experts believed that liquor laws were contributing to an image of Kansas as a backward state. Business leaders trying to lure new industries to the state found liquor laws to be a frequent topic of conversation by prospective investors. In 1984 Kansas was one of only four States -- Oklahoma, Utah, and West Virginia being the other three -- with some type of liquor prohibition. At the point liquor by the drink became a public issue in Kansas, Oklahoma voters were considering a ballot amendment of their own in the 1984 general election. That issue passed.

When Governor John Carlin visited Japan on a trade mission in June of 1984, he found that the Kansas image problem existed there. Business contacts told of staying in hotels on the Missouri side of the river in Kansas City to have access to restaurants and bars. While visiting a Tokyo Pizza Hut (the company began in Wichita, Kansas), Carlin discovered that the owner had spent time at Pizza Hut's headquarters in Wichita. When the owner was asked what he thought of Wichita and Kansas, his first response was that he didn't like it because of its drinking laws.

Carlin returned to Kansas determined to do something about the state's image. Ironically, soon after his return, Pizza Hut announced it was considering moving its corporate headquarters from Wichita because it was having trouble attracting top-notch people. In discussions with Pizza Hut's CEO (a non-drinker), Carlin learned that part of the image problem Wichita had was related to experiences job interviewees had when confronting confusing liquor laws in their attempts to dine in Wichita restaurants.

Throughout the summer of 1984 Carlin and his staff members discussed the advisability of promoting a constitutional amendment vote for the 1986 election. By

late summer, the decision was made that Carlin would become the first Kansas governor to take an active role in attempting to change the controversial prohibition provision in the constitution. What follows is an analysis of the communication strategies employed in each of the three stages of the campaign. Each section is organized chronologically with functions clearly identified as one of the four types explained in the previous section: education, trust development, development of a positive message, and neutralization of the opposition.

The Pre-Ballot Approval Stage

The first stage in the campaign began in July, 1984 and lasted until the opening of the legislative session in January, 1985. Carlin and his advisors discussed the timing of announcing his support for the issue. It was determined that there was no need to wait until the State of the State address in January to spring the issue on the legislature. Because the speech would get attention even if the controversial issue were news months or weeks prior to the beginning of the session, it was determined that it was more important to go public prior to the session to begin to secure public support. Before going public, however, it was determined that key groups needed to be contacted and enlisted in the effort. Trust development was considered important in gaining public support. After meetings with and decisions by key leaders became known to the press, the public phase could begin.

The private phase of the campaign involved meetings with key leaders of the Kansas Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI) and labor groups. Carlin wanted assurances that business and labor would support his move to get an amendment on the ballot. KCCI was scheduled to hold a series of regional legislative agenda-setting meetings in September, and if liquor by the drink were to be a part of their lobbying agenda, it was necessary to meet with them prior to the regional caucuses. The private meetings were geared at educating Chamber members on the

importance of the issue from an economic development perspective. A similar message was presented to labor groups and other opinion leaders during summer discussions. Both groups also needed assurances that Carlin would play an active role in promoting the issue.

KCCI's participation was necessary for trust development in the lobbying process with legislators. KCCI would also serve as an important conduit for educational messages throughout the business community as the campaign progressed.

In early September, the KCCI Board of Directors voted to support a liquor by the drink amendment during the 1985 session. At Carlin's weekly news conference on September 14, 1984 a reporter asked if Carlin was prepared to support the amendment. Carlin's answer became his first public statement on the issue. In responding to the question, he explained his involvement with KCCI prior to their vote. His response outlined the position he would take throughout the remainder of the campaign. He explained his decision as a matter of economics and image. He referred to the Japanese incident to which the reporter had alluded in his question and explained other recent incidents of a similar nature that were giving rise to a negative business image of Kansas.

Press accounts of Carlin's support dominated the news for the next week, and many editorial writers announced their support. Some editorials commented on the hypocritical nature of the liquor laws and stressed the fact that the change would be beneficial in terms of outside perceptions while having little effect on drinking habits. Thus, a key argument in the educational process was rapidly disseminated.

Once Carlin's position was public, his speeches incorporated messages about the need for liquor by the drink along with several other changes he planned to support in the session. Scheduling, speeches, and press opportunities were all planned with an eye toward maximum exposure for the legislative issues. Within

the week after the press conference, he included the issue in a speech before the Abilene Rotary. Because of the importance of tourism in the home of the Eisenhower Presidential Library, Carlin was able to stress the image issue. At the end of September at the annual meeting of the League of Municipalities, he gave the first major speech incorporating the issue which received widespread statewide coverage. Carlin urged members to adopt a resolution on liquor by the drink. With a positive vote the following day, another key group was enlisted behind the effort.

Five days after the news conference, the lobbyist for private clubs in Kansas announced a new group -- Kansans for Responsible Liquor Reform -- to lobby during the session. The next day, a Carlin-backed lobbying group was announced. The state's secretary of human resources, Jerry Shelor, who had been on the trip to Japan, was to resign his cabinet position to head the group. Kansans for Effective Liquor Control, Shelor's group, eventually became the major lobbying force with both the legislature and the public.

While proponents were organizing, the state's dry forces were also gearing up for another in a long line of battles. Prohibition forces have never died out in Kansas. In 1984 the modern version of the Women's Temperance Union, Kansas United Dry Forces, and other prohibitionist groups was Kansans for Life At Its Best. The group was headed by Reverend Richard Taylor, a Methodist minister who had been assigned to the statehouse as a lobbyist shortly after the 1970 vote. Taylor was active, vocal, visible, and well-known throughout the state. He had a regular television show as well as a network for conducting low-cost lobbying efforts. Taylor had a relatively small, but dedicated cadre of followers which had succeeded in preventing passage of a constitutional amendment resolution in attempts prior to the 1985 effort.

Between September and the opening of the session on January 14, 1985, ef-

forts were directed at securing key endorsements, educating the public to ensure popular support when it was time for legislators to vote, fundraising for lobbying efforts, and influencing 1984 legislative candidates. The AFL-CIO endorsed the resolution as did the Kansas Lodging Association, and the state's attorney general -- the key law enforcement officer in the state. By having powerful groups and individuals behind the issue, the credibility and clout needed to sway legislators was growing.

Private efforts were waged as well as public ones. Both the KCCI and AFL-CIO leadership wrote letters in October to legislative candidates urging them not to commit themselves on the issue until "all the facts have been presented." The letters stressed the need to avoid the emotionalism of the issue and to learn the facts about the effect passage of liquor by the drink would have on economic development.

At the same time the private sector was seeking to neutralize the opposition through their letters and lobbying efforts with candidates, Carlin attempted to neutralize Reverend Taylor's efforts. Carlin called key bishops in the Methodist church to explain why he was supporting the issue. He assured them that he was not supporting the issue because of the liquor lobby. Carlin did not hope to get the bishops to overlook their church resolutions against liquor by the drink, but hoped to minimize their concerns so that they would moderate their support of Reverend Taylor. While it is not known if the calls had a direct effect, the Methodist bishops did not take an active role in campaigning against the amendment.

Although Taylor originally was asked by the church to be a full-time lobbyist, church support had declined, and Taylor's efforts were more on behalf of a dedicated group of prohibitionists rather than the Methodist church. The name change from Kansas United Dry Forces to Kansans for Life at its Best was an at-

tempt to remove the stereotype of the prohibitionists and to suggest that the group had concerns beyond liquor control. Most of those concerns, however, dealt with other "sin" issues such as pari-mutuel and the lottery.

Unlike the experience in North Carolina or Oklahoma where fundamentalist religious groups organized against passage of liberalized drinking laws, the religious issue in Kansas was virtually nonexistent even though a minister headed the prohibitionist forces. In fact, religious leaders from mainstream denominations offered to neutralize the religious arguments by forming a coalition of clergy. Their intent was to demonstrate that "God had not taken sides" if Taylor chose to make strong appeals based on religion. The need for such action did not materialize, however, as Taylor avoided exaggerating the element of "sin" in this "sin issue."

Carlin's policy and constituent services staffs attempted to neutralize arguments from individual supporters of Reverend Taylor's position by drafting a letter of response to their pleas to change his position. The letter stressed Carlin's support of tougher laws and stiffer penalties (see appendix).

Proponents also attempted to neutralize the antis by removing the issue from a traditional wet-dry focus. Three facts were noted in developing these arguments. First, was the fact that Kansas had liquor by the drink through the club system. Second, statistics showed declines in consumption as a result of tougher drinking laws. Third, there was an increased awareness nationwide of alcohol abuse and its societal effects. Furthermore, the name of the lobbying group -- Kansans for Effective Liquor Control -- suggested that even proponents recognized the need for control of a potentially dangerous substance.

All arguments by proponents stressed positive messages -- improved image, economic development, and effective control of abusers. Communication activities during this stage were almost exclusively instrumental. Occasional press con-

ferences to announce a group's support accounted for the only ritualistic activity in the pre-ballot approval stage.

Ballot Approval Stage

Technically the ballot approval stage began with the opening of the legislature on January 14, 1985. However, lobbying of legislative candidates by both proponents and opponents began as soon as it became clear that a full-scale effort for passage of a resolution would be waged. Once votes were tallied on November 6, lobbying efforts intensified.

One other important event occurred prior to the session that helped lobbyists and Carlin with lobbying efforts during the session. On November 9 Carlin announced he would not run against Senator Bob Dole in 1986. Most political observers were certain Carlin would run against Dole since he was prohibited from seeking a third term as governor. Carlin's announcement surprised many of those observers both in its content and timing. Carlin, however, felt it necessary to announce the decision prior to the 1985 session to avoid jeopardizing the liquor by the drink issue as well as several other key elements of his legislative program. Carlin, a Democrat, had to deal with a Republican controlled legislature in both the House and the Senate. Soon after announcing his intent to support liquor by the drink, Republican leaders accused Carlin of wanting the issue on the ballot as a drawing card for supporters in a race against Dole. In order to secure passage of his legislative program, Carlin believed he should remove politics from the arguments. While some questioned Carlin's sincerity, Carlin's failure to act like a candidate especially where fundraising was concerned, eventually neutralized the political issue.

On January 15, 1985 Carlin presented his State of the State address to the legislature. The speech broke with the tradition of presenting a laundry list of programs outlined in the formal, printed message. Instead, Carlin chose to build

an argument for the entire legislative package in terms of the need for change to meet economic competition. As a "lame duck" governor prevented from seeking a third four-year term in 1986, Carlin hoped to capitalize on his non-political intentions.

In presenting the liquor by the drink issue in the address, Carlin related it to other changes he felt were necessary for economic development and for promoting a perception of change and progress in the state. The other issues, such as state banking laws, were also outdated. Carlin's message on liquor by the drink stressed the need to remove the negative image of being a backward state. He also stressed the fact that liquor by the drink was not a wet-dry issue because of the club card system, and he promised to support even tougher drinking laws than those he had signed two years before. In arguing that the money spent on enforcing the club card laws could be better spent on enforcing tougher laws for abusers, he sought to further neutralize Reverend Taylor's arguments.

The approval process began with the introduction of the resolution in the Senate where historically there had been more interest. In addition, the leadership in the Senate was more supportive than that of the House where the Speaker of the House openly opposed the amendment. The chairman of the Federal and State Affairs Committee, to which the bill was assigned, was a strong supporter, and was an important factor in securing votes in the Senate. As research by Cahn, Pappas, and Schoen on the effectiveness of speech in the United States Senate indicates, "speaking in the committee room influences legislation more than speaking on the floor of the Senate."[27] As will be demonstrated as this stage is explained, the interpersonal dimension was effective not only in the committee room but also through private conversations.

One of the major functions of communication at this stage was to mitigate the effects of Taylor's influence. As with most single-issue groups, the anti

forces represented a minority that drew much of its power from being vocal and visible. Those who oppose an issue traditionally are more likely to write, call, or lobby legislators because, in most cases, it is the one issue about which they are concerned.

Reverend Taylor's group fit this mold and was a powerful force with which to contend. Many legislators feared Taylor's ability to translate a positive vote on liquor into a negative image for a legislator with constituents. Taylor's influence was especially strong in rural and western parts of the state where voter turnout was traditionally high. The rural and western influence in the House, where it was necessary to get 84 votes from 125 representatives, increased the need to neutralize Taylor's lobbying efforts.

As a result, the real efforts in the ballot approval stage took place behind closed doors. The interpersonal dimension was especially important for the activities coming from the governor's office. Both Carlin and his policy staff members met with key legislative leaders as well as with rank and file members to discuss the issue in terms of the economic development impact. Carlin also agreed to sign a set of "get-tough" bills and a bill to raise the legal drinking age for beer to 21 using a three-year phase-in. In agreeing to that, Carlin secured the support of several key Republican senators for the resolution.

The negotiation process was not simple, however. The senators wanted action on the get-tough package prior to a vote on liquor by the drink. Carlin refused knowing that he would lose leverage with many Senate and House members if he signed prior to approval of the resolution. He made it clear that it was all or nothing. Get tough laws would be vetoed if they reached his desk prior to approval of the resolution.

The Senate passed the resolution, and it was sent to the House where it faced tough opposition, in part, because of the Speaker's opposition. According

to procedure, the speaker did not have to let the issue come up for a vote. However, the polls conducted by lobbying groups as well as by individual legislators showed widespread support. This fact made it difficult for the speaker to shelve the issue, especially since he was contemplating running for governor in 1986.

The one consistent message stressed by all those lobbying legislators was the need to give the people the right to vote. This was a message high in positive appeal and gave some legislators an opportunity to vote "yes" on the resolution without supporting the issue per se.

Even with this approach, the campaign in the House was much more difficult than in the Senate. Taylor and other opponents sought to add provisions to the resolution that would water down the intent, confuse the issue, and ultimately ensure its defeat. Provisions were added in the House committee for a county option approval and for requirements that fifty percent of a businesses revenues be from food in order to maintain a liquor license.

By the time the resolution went to the floor of the House, it did not resemble the Senate version in most key areas thus guaranteeing the need for a conference committee if the resolution passed the House. The first final action in the House -- a vote on the House version of the bill with floor amendments -- was the most dramatic point in the second stage. Going into the vote there were 82 votes that were relatively firm or thought to be leaning toward "yes." Eighty-four were needed for passage. The governor's office had been successful in finding individuals who were willing to support the resolution as the 84th vote, but they did not want to be the 83rd in case the issue went down in defeat. If they were going to vote "yes" and suffer the political consequences, they wanted it to be for a successful effort. Thus, the search for the 83rd vote was significant.

In order to prevent the speaker from gaveling the issue dead as soon as it

was obvious there were only 82 votes, two supporters were absent from the floor when the vote came up. A call of the house was ordered to locate them before the vote was taken. Continuing a call requires a show of only 10 hands; therefore, it was somewhat easy to delay the vote until the 83rd vote was secured. Carlin used the time during the call to telephone a potential 83rd vote. While Carlin was on the phone, other lobbyists and house members were making calls to secure "yes" votes or to discourage changes.

Carlin chose as his target for the 83rd vote a representative who was also well-known to him through business dealings prior to either one's election to his current position. The choice was significant in that the legislator's predecessor was one of the most outspoken opponents of liquor by the drink. The previous office holder, a lay minister, had led most of the floor fights against the issue. Carlin argued that the vote was in the best interest of the state as well as the legislator's district and that he should look at the larger picture of state needs. Carlin told him that it was time for someone representing a district such as his to make a bold move as a signal of change. The appeal worked. Thus both instrumental and ritualistic functions were served through Carlin's selection of the target for his appeal. With the 83rd vote secured, the 81st and 82nd votes came out of hiding. The 84th vote quickly followed.

A conference committee was then appointed, and the process continued in much the same manner as it had before. Compromise was the name of the game at that point. Despite the speaker's opposition to the issue, he did make reasonable appointments to the conference committee, and as a member himself voted it out of committee. However, he continued to oppose it in the House.

The final resolution included a 30 percent food provision, a county option provision which stated that the issue not only had to receive a majority of the total votes cast statewide but also had to be passed by a majority within an in-

dividual county for the county to have liquor by the drink, a provision for a revote by any county wishing to change either to or from liquor by the drink after the 1986 vote, and a provision for temporary licenses to allow for sales at conventions and receptions.

While the legislators were the primary target of communication in this stage, the public was not forgotten. Once the session began, lobbyists and Carlin made public statements seeking to further the educational process begun in the fall. Carlin prepared two articles for his monthly newspaper column to promote the educational function. One explained several aspects of his legislative package; the other was a two-sided analysis of the liquor by the drink issue. While most of the papers regularly carrying the column were weeklies, editors of the major dailies and managers of television and radio stations used the columns as background for editorials. Thus, they served the purpose of informing opinion leaders on the issue.

Shelor and others in his lobbying group went on the speaking circuit, and the news media presented several debates between Shelor and Taylor. Advertising space was purchased and fundraisers were organized to keep the issue before the public. Shelor's group also polled and used the results to bolster their arguments with legislators. Shelor organized a petition campaign (see appendix). The petition furthered two functions. It sought to educate voters on the issue and the legislative process and to emphasize the trust function by listing the names of those supporting the effort. Without the evidence of widespread public support, the resolution would not have passed. In the end, the resolution was adopted by a constitutional two-thirds of each house thus assuring another vote by Kansans.

As with the previous stage, communication was predominantly instrumental. The dramatic effect of Carlin's calls to House members during the debates which

were publicized by the press as well as some of the parliamentary maneuvering during both committee meetings and floor debate served a ritualistic function. The use of petitions also had a ritualistic dimension as did Carlin's use of "the power of the office" through newspaper columns. However, content as opposed to form dominated the communication activities in this stage.

The Election

The legislature passed the resolution in April, 1985. The public vote did not take place until November, 1986. Thus, two major problems confronted proponents. First, they needed to keep the issue alive with the voters for an extended period of time. This was especially important in light of the 1970 experience in which the polls showed a majority favoring the issue only to see it lose. Second, the education process needed to continue because of the complexity of the final resolution. It was feared that some voters would yield to opponents' pleas and vote "no" thinking that their city or county would have liquor by the drink if it carried statewide.

In the interim period, Shelor's group continued to raise funds for advertising and planned their approach for the 1986 election. Shelor also enlisted support of additional groups including the major law enforcement organizations.

Carlin continued to include liquor by the drink in speeches outlining his economic development plan for Kansas, and members of the state chamber began compiling fact sheets for distribution to businesses within their cities. Carlin made a point of telling audience members that they needed to vote "yes" in their individual counties in order to have liquor by the drink, and he focused on local tourist activities as potential losers if the issue failed. Carlin also appointed a Liquor Law Review Board at the close of the 1986 session. The Board, headed by a district judge, was instructed to make recommendations for improving Kansas' liquor laws and for suggesting ways to implement the amendment should it pass. In

appointing the Board, Carlin intended to send a signal that effective control was a part of the overall game plan.

The campaign reached its greatest point of interest after the August primary election. Carlin spent the summer of 1986 promoting passage of the two amendments on the August primary ballot. He planned to spend the three months prior to the general election promoting the four he had taken an active role in steering through the legislative process. While he was not an enthusiastic supporter of the education amendment, when asked his position, he indicated his support to avoid confusion on the "Vote Yes" theme.

Since little money was coming in for the lobbying group and apathy was potentially the major opponent, it was determined that the issue needed to remain as highly visible as possible. Reverend Taylor who also had little money for his campaign, welcomed the opportunity to appear at any available forum. Throughout the fall, he debated Shelor, other lobbyists, and Chamber officials in cities throughout the state.

During the summer, Carlin received an invitation to speak at a Chautauqua revival in Beloit, a community that had been a major stopping point for Chautauquas earlier in the century and historically represents an area opposed to liquor reform. The invitation indicated that Reverend Taylor would also be speaking and suggested that Carlin might want to address the liquor by the drink topic. After discussions with key staff members, it was determined that the organizers be approached with a proposal for a debate between Carlin and Taylor. The offer was made to Taylor, and he readily accepted.

On September 14, 1986, exactly two years after Carlin publicly announced his intentions to support a liquor by the drink amendment, the debate was held. Unlike most candidate debates which are more appropriately labeled joint press conferences or forums, this encounter was a true debate. A format was negotiated

that included ten-minute opening speeches, followed by questions submitted in writing from audience members to which each candidate would respond, and concluded with five-minute rebuttal speeches. The question-answer segment was especially conducive to direct clash as both debaters responded to the other's answers as the second respondent or in response to later questions.

It was determined that Carlin's opening speech should serve the functions of education, neutralization, and promoting a positive message. References to law enforcement supporters as a trust development device would be saved for rebuttal. It was also determined that Carlin's message should be consistent with the message being used by others who had debated Taylor and with fact sheets being distributed by the Chamber. Reverend Taylor had claimed from the beginning of the campaign in 1984 that he would win by presenting voters with the facts about liquor. Because of Taylor's emphasis on the facts, it was also determined that the speech should avoid the emotional facets of the issue and concentrate on facts.

A copy of the opening speech is included in the appendix; however, a summary of the salient points demonstrates how the objectives were achieved. Carlin began by pointing out the similarities between what he and Taylor desired for Kansans, essentially, a better life. He also immediately took the debate out of the context of one about "morality, consumption, or safety" by presenting "facts" to show the religious use of wine, the decline of consumption in Kansas and in states that had recently liberalized laws, and the increased number of arrests for alcohol-related offenses as well as improved highway accident statistics. Carlin also went back to his original arguments regarding economic development and image and finally appealed to two values that are touted as traditionally Kansan -- honesty and friendliness. The debate was positive, and was described by the press as "friendly." Many in the audience of over 500 tended to be supporters of Taylor or sympathetic with his position; however, there were no overt signs of hostility

toward Carlin's position although it had been speculated there might be.

The event received statewide coverage because of its uniqueness. Radio, television, and print covered it. Carlin used the power of the office to help get the type of coverage he wanted by inviting statehouse reporters to accompany him to the event on the state plane (they were billed for a portion of the cost, however).

After the debate, two of the state's major newspapers, *The Topeka Capital-Journal* and *The Kansas City Star* invited Taylor and Carlin to submit statements for pro-con forums. The two also accepted an invitation for a televised debate on the Topeka CBS affiliate station. While there were several other invitations for the two to debate, Carlin and his staff determined that the effectiveness would wane if overused. At that point, one month prior to the election, Carlin needed to devote time to other constitutional issues which required considerably more education.

Thus, the bulk of the campaigning was left up to Shelor and others supporting the amendment. Polls showed sufficient support statewide for passage. However, the experience of 1970 served as a reminder that the polls were an enemy in terms of being a rallying device for opponents. The real strategy became one of keeping the issue alive. The most common communication activities were presentation of a stock speech and debates before community groups. Of all the amendments on the ballot, the press was most interested in liquor by the drink because of its historical significance. Thus, it was easy to get coverage of these activities. While there was little revenue for advertising, the little advertising that was used was targeted at combating apathy. One television spot was run statewide (see appendix for script) which emphasized the closeness of the 1970 vote and the need for voters not to take passage for granted. A tabletop advertisement was distributed to private restaurants throughout the state emphasizing

the same message (see appendix). A brochure (see appendix) stressed "yes" and also served to answer the consumption arguments as well as to stress the need to vote.

On November 4, 1986 Kansans went to the polls and a majority voted "yes." The final vote was 487,996 in favor and 325,423 opposed. Thirty-six of the state's 105 counties approved the measure. Most of those counties were urban and were located along major interstate highways. On July 1, 1987 the law implementing the resolution went into effect, and, according to some, Kansas slipped into the 20th century with little time to spare.

Conclusions

The importance of issue ballot campaigns cannot be ignored. Their impact can be great, as California discovered after passage of Proposition 13 several years ago. Because of the significance of these campaigns, we believe it is important to study the rhetorical strategies that can be employed by those on either side of an issue. Unlike candidate campaigns, issue campaigns must deal with facts and often with complex ideas. As a result, they provide significant insights into the structure and strategies of public policy arguments.

We have presented a framework for organizing and analyzing an issue campaign based on a study of the communication strategies typically employed by those who are successful in advocating their position. In doing so, we have sought to further the research in this often-neglected area of political communication as well as assist practitioners in preparing persuasive messages for campaigns.

In positing a theory about issue campaigns and by using descriptive analysis to support that theory, we have provided the first step in conducting additional research to test the model. Arguments used for each stage can be further examined through application of other aspects of rhetorical theory, political communication theory, and argumentation field theory. For example, we believe that the

framework described is especially compatible with Schuetz's analysis of the overlays of legislative argumentation. While Schuetz's method applied to arguments within one stage of the three involved in ballot issue campaigns, the same type of analysis could be applied to the other two. Comparisons of the function, form, language, and audience of arguments as presented at each stage of an issues campaign is a logical step in argumentation research.

The fact that many of the communication activities described in the case study entailed interpersonal rather than public persuasion also suggests a largely untapped area for future research. The growing body of research on the interpersonal dimension of persuasion provides a theoretical base for such analysis.

Finally, we would encourage communication researchers not to ignore the vast data base available at the state and local levels. Access to information, especially information providing insights into interpersonal dimensions of arguments, is often easily accessible to a researcher. In the past few years state governments have been especially active and innovative in developing new approaches to public policy matters. This level of policy making definitely warrants more study, and examination of issue campaigns offers one means of analyzing the communication that occurs in formulating state and local policy.

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STATE OF KANSAS

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
State Capitol
Topeka 66612-1590

John Carlin *Governor*

October 15, 1984

Dear :

I appreciate your letter expressing your views on liquor by the drink. Please be assured that I also am concerned about the problems associated with irresponsible use of alcohol and other drugs.

In 1982, I appointed a Governor's Committee on Drinking and Driving. This group recommended, and I signed into law, stiffer drinking and driving penalties. We have seen the results of these efforts as alcohol-related traffic fatalities in Kansas have decreased in the last two years. Other recommendations of this Committee have been adopted, and I will be proposing further actions to control this problem to the 1985 Legislature. Efforts directed at getting drunk drivers off the street will continue to be a priority in my Administration. I also pledge continued support for state and local programs that assist in the prevention and treatment of the crippling disease of alcoholism.

For those, such as myself, who are committed to combatting alcohol problems, there is a desire to disprove the myth that 19th century approaches will solve alcohol problems of the 20th century. For too long, too many Kansans have hidden behind the myth that a prohibition against liquor by the drink reduces alcohol-related problems in our society. We must have the courage to address these sensitive issues.

Current Kansas liquor laws are outdated, confusing and hypocritical. Our present system, which simply requires a club membership, allows Kansans easy access to alcohol. We know from past experience that prohibition does not stop consumption. We must accept the fact that people will drink. We should develop liquor laws that do not make law breakers of our citizens and that allow for effective enforcement.

Liquor by the drink will reduce the complexity of alcohol regulation and allow us to concentrate our manpower and resources on enforcement efforts directed at those who habitually break the law. By increasing the effectiveness of our enforcement and providing programs for people to cope with liquor problems, we can become a state that encourages responsible alcohol consumption.

I feel strongly that liquor by the drink will not increase consumption of liquor by Kansans. This change will make our laws more enforceable and therefore enhance our ability to deal with those who choose not to obey our laws. By strengthening our efforts to rid our roads of drunk drivers, and by increasing our commitment to prevention and treatment of alcohol-related problems, we can bring our liquor laws into line with current thinking. Further, I am confident that our state will reap the benefits of this move through a more positive image for economic development.

Again, thank you for your letter. I am pleased to have the opportunity to share with you my reasons for advocating this change.

Sincerely,

JOHN CARLIN
Governor

JC:pd

NEWS

JOHN CARLIN

GOVERNOR OF KANSAS

Michael Swenson, Press Secretary The Statehouse, Topeka 66612 (913) 296-2716

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: September 14, 1986

Attached is a copy of Governor John Carlin's opening speech for the debate on liquor by the drink with the Reverend Richard Taylor. The debate will take place a 2:00 p.m. in Chautauqua Park in Beloit, Kansas.

I WANT TO BEGIN BY THANKING THE ORGANIZERS OF THE BELOIT CHAUTAUQUA FOR INVITING REVEREND TAYLOR AND ME TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU. IN NOVEMBER YOU AND OTHER KANSANS WILL GO TO THE POLLS TO MAKE MANY IMPORTANT CHOICES FOR THE FUTURE OF KANSAS. ONE OF THOSE CHOICES IS WHETHER OR NOT KANSAS WILL HAVE LIQUOR BY THE DRINK, AND I AM PLEASED THAT THROUGH THIS CHAUTAUQUA CITIZENS ACROSS KANSAS WILL HEAR BOTH SIDES OF THIS ISSUE.

THE ISSUE OF LIQUOR BY THE DRINK IS A LONG-STANDING ONE IN OUR STATE'S HISTORY, AND I BELIEVE IT'S TIME TO CONCLUDE THE DEBATE. TODAY, I WANT TO EXPLAIN WHY I BELIEVE KANSANS SHOULD VOTE "YES" ON THE AMENDMENT.

I WANT TO BEGIN MY DISCUSSION BY NOTING THAT ALTHOUGH REVEREND TAYLOR AND I TAKE DIFFERENT SIDES IN THIS DEBATE, WE'RE NOT TOTALLY IN DISAGREEMENT. I, TOO, LOVE KANSAS AND WANT THE BEST LIFE POSSIBLE FOR OUR CITIZENS. I HAVE DEVOTED NEARLY 16 YEARS OF PUBLIC SERVICE TO THAT GOAL. AND IF I BELIEVED THAT HAVING LIQUOR BY THE DRINK WOULD HURT OUR STATE AND OUR PEOPLE, I WOULD NOT SUPPORT IT. HOWEVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IS TRUE FOR SEVERAL REASONS, AND THOSE REASONS ARE BEST EXPLAINED BY LOOKING AT WHAT THIS DEBATE OVER LIQUOR BY THE DRINK IS <u>NOT</u>.

FIRST, THIS IS NOT A DEBATE OVER A MORAL ISSUE. LIQUOR AND THE CONSUMPTION OF LIQUOR ARE NOT IMMORAL IN AND OF THEMSELVES. IT IS THE ABUSE OF ALCOHOL THAT CREATES PROBLEMS, NOT THE USE.

IF IT WERE IMMORAL TO CONSUME ALCOHOL WE WOULD NOT FIND CHURCHES USING WINE IN RELIGIOUS CEREMONIES. WE WOULD NOT FIND REFERENCES IN THE BIBLE TO CHRIST'S USE OF WINE. IN FACT, THE FIRST MIRACLE WAS THAT OF TURNING WATER INTO WINE.

CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL IS NOT SINFUL, IMMORAL, OR WRONG. BUT WE

ARE NOT REALLY TALKING ABOUT A CONSUMPTION ISSUE IN THIS DEBATE EITHER. AND THAT IS THE SECOND THING THIS DEBATE IS NOT ABOUT. THERE IS NO PROOF THAT ALLOWING LIQUOR BY THE DRINK WILL INCREASE CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL IN KANSAS.

WHY? BECAUSE THE FACTS SUPPORT THAT CLAIM. IT IS A FACT THAT AFTER WE LIBERALIZED OUR LIQUOR LAWS IN 1979 TO ALLOW THE RECIPROCAL CLUB SYSTEM, OUR CONSUMPTION DID NOT GO UP IN THE LONG RUN. CONSUMPTION ROSE SLIGHTLY, PEAKING IN 1982, BUT HAS DECLINED EVER SINCE. IN 1985 CONSUMPTION FIGURES IN KANSAS WERE 1.22 GALLONS PER CAPITA. THAT IS LOWER THAN THE 1.26 GALLONS IN 1977, TWO YEARS BEFORE THE LAWS WERE LIBERALIZED.

SO EVEN WITH LIBERALIZED ACCESS TO LIQUOR FOR KANSANS SINCE 1979, WE STILL RANK 45TH IN CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL. AND I BELIEVE THAT FIGURE WILL REMAIN UNCHANGED AFTER WE PASS THE AMENDMENT.

THE EXPERIENCE OF STATES SUCH AS THE CAROLINAS, TEXAS, IOWA, AND OKLAHOMA INDICATES THAT CONSUMPTION WILL NOT INCREASE WITH LIBERALIZED LIQUOR LAWS. IN ALL THOSE STATES, LIQUOR CONSUMPTION HAS STEADILY DECLINED AFTER TEMPORARY ~~MINOR~~ INCREASES. IN FACT, CONSUMPTION IN THE NATION AS A WHOLE IS DECLINING. PEOPLE ARE AWARE OF THE DANGERS OF ALCOHOL ABUSE, AND THEY ARE REACTING TO INCREASED EMPHASIS ON HEALTH AND SAFETY FACTORS AND TO TOUGHER DRUNKEN DRIVING LAWS AND STRICTER ENFORCEMENT.

THE FACT IS, THOSE WHO ABUSE ALCOHOL WILL DO SO WHETHER WE HAVE LIQUOR BY THE DRINK OR NOT. MANY SUCH INDIVIDUALS SUFFER FROM A DISEASE, AND THOSE WHO TREAT ALCOHOLISM RECOGNIZE IT AS SUCH. WE NEED TO FIND WAYS TO TREAT THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO SUFFER FROM THAT PROBLEM, AND WE NEED TO PUT MORE OF OUR EFFORTS INTO EDUCATING OUR CITIZENS ABOUT THE PROBLEM.

AND I THINK THAT HERE IN KANSAS WE'RE DOING THAT EFFECTIVELY. THAT DOESN'T MEAN WE CAN'T DO MORE, AND I SUPPORT DOING MORE BECAUSE SAFETY IS A ~~PRIMARY~~ major CONCERN. BUT SAFETY ISN'T REALLY THE ISSUE IN THIS DEBATE EITHER. AND THAT'S A THIRD OBSERVATION I WANT ~~TO~~ would MAKE ~~TODAY.~~

WE HAVE STIFFENED OUR DRINKING LAWS. THAT WAS PART OF THE PACKAGE I SUPPORTED ALONG WITH GETTING THE AMENDMENT ON THE BALLOT. WE'VE ALSO RAISED ~~OUR~~ two DRINKING AGE. WE'RE CRACKING DOWN ON OFFENDERS THROUGH STIFFER LAWS AND BY GIVING ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS ~~BETTER~~ more TOOLS, SUCH AS BREATH TESTS, TO FIND THOSE WHO DRIVE AND DRINK. THE RESULT IS THAT THE KANSAS HIGHWAY PATROL IS ARRESTING MORE INDIVIDUALS--INDIVIDUALS THEY WOULDN'T HAVE CAUGHT BEFORE WE MADE CHANGES IN THE LAW.

THAT DOESN'T MEAN WE HAVE MORE DRUNK DRIVERS ON THE ROAD, HOWEVER. FOR OTHER STATES' EXPERIENCES INDICATE THERE IS NO CORRELATION BETWEEN LIBERALIZING LIQUOR LAWS AND AN INCREASED INCIDENCE OF DRUNK DRIVING. STUDIES IN THE CAROLINAS AFTER THE PASSAGE OF LIQUOR BY THE DRINK INDICATED NO CORRELATION BETWEEN THE AVAILABILITY OF LIQUOR AND DRUNK DRIVING. A SIMILAR STUDY IN SEVEN STATES WITH LIQUOR BY THE DRINK FOR 20 YEARS OR ~~MORE INDICATED NO~~ SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN DRUNK DRIVING, AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT RATES, OR CRIME AFTER LIQUOR LAWS WERE CHANGED.

I CONTEND THAT THE SAME WILL BE TRUE IN KANSAS. AND IT ~~IS~~ ALREADY TRUE BECAUSE, FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES, WE ~~DO~~ HAVE LIQUOR BY THE DRINK Today's ~~FOR KANSANS~~. THE CLUB SYSTEM SEES TO THAT.

BUT THE BOTTOM LINE IS That KANSANS ARE NOT UNINTELLIGENT. THEY CAN READ THE FACTS ABOUT DRINKING AND DRIVING. ~~THEY~~ Kansans ARE NOT CALLOUS. THEY CARE ABOUT THE SAFETY OF FRIENDS AND FAMILY. KANSANS HAVE

COMMON SENSE. I BELIEVE THAT THE VALUES KANSANS STAND FOR ARE WHAT KEEP OUR CONSUMPTION LEVEL AT 45TH IN THE NATION, NOT OUR DRINKING LAWS.

THEREFORE, WE WILL NOT HAVE WHOLESALE SLAUGHTER ON OUR HIGHWAYS. THERE WILL NOT BE MORE FAMILIES SUFFERING THE RAVAGES OF ALCOHOLISM. IN FACT, IF WE HAVE LIQUOR BY THE DRINK, WE CAN TURN OUR ATTENTION AWAY FROM ENFORCEMENT OF THE CLUB SYSTEM TO FURTHER ENFORCEMENT OF STRICTER DRINKING AND DRIVING LAWS AND TO MORE EDUCATION FOR OUR CITIZENS ABOUT THE HAZARDS OF ALCOHOL ABUSE.

IN SUMMARY, THIS IS NOT A DEBATE OVER PROHIBITION VERSUS DRINKING. WE DO NOT HAVE PROHIBITION IN THIS STATE, AND EVEN THE REVEREND TAYLOR IS NOT ADVOCATING ITS RETURN. HE KNOWS IT DOESN'T WORK. HE IS MERELY ADVOCATING THE MAINTENANCE OF THE STATUS QUO WHICH IS IN FACT LIQUOR BY THE DRINK.

WITH ALL THAT IN MIND, THEN WHAT DOES THIS DEBATE BOIL DOWN TO? IF WE HAVE LIQUOR BY THE DRINK NOW, WHY DO WE NEED THIS AMENDMENT? IT'S SIMPLE. WE NEED IT TO END THE HYPOCRISY THAT WE IN KANSAS NOW DISPLAY TOWARD ALCOHOL. OUR HYPOCRISY CREATES AN INCORRECT IMAGE OF THE STATE AND DIVERTS OUR ATTENTION AWAY FROM THOSE ALCOHOL-RELATED PROBLEMS WE SHOULD BE CONSIDERING SUCH AS ENFORCEMENT AND EDUCATION. IN THE END, THIS IS NOT A MORALITY, CONSUMPTION, OR SAFETY ISSUE BUT AN ECONOMIC ISSUE.

WHETHER WE WANT TO ADMIT IT OR NOT, WE ARE A WET STATE. ANY KANSAN, AS I HAVE ALREADY NOTED, CAN GET SOMETHING TO DRINK WHETHER IT BE BY THE BOTTLE OR BY THE DRINK. WE, HOWEVER, TELL OUTSIDERS THAT THEY CANNOT GET LIQUOR BY THE DRINK, AND WHAT IS WORSE, WE TELL THEM THEY CANNOT EAT IN MANY OF OUR RESTAURANTS EVEN WHEN THEY DON'T WANT TO DRINK.

WE, IN KANSAS, WHO PRIDE OURSELVES ON BEING FRIENDLY, TURN THOUSANDS OF TRAVELERS AWAY FROM OUR RESTAURANTS BECAUSE OF the OUR CLUB SYSTEM. ONE RESTAURANT CHAIN ALONE REPORTS LOST REVENUE AMOUNTING TO $600,000 PER YEAR. THAT IS WHY THIS DEBATE IS ONE OF ECONOMICS MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE.

RESTAURANT CHAINS ARE HESITANT TO EXPAND and OR LOCATE IN KANSAS BECAUSE THEY MUST TURN CUSTOMERS AWAY, THUS HURTING THEIR OWN CHAIN'S IMAGE AS WELL AS THAT OF OUR STATE'S. IF WE WERE TO PASS LIQUOR BY THE DRINK, ONE CHAIN HAS INDICATED to me IT WOULD BUILD THREE TO NINE NEW RESTAURANTS--NOT OPEN SALOONS, ~~MIND YOU~~, BUT RESTAURANTS WHERE FAMILIES CAN DINE WITHOUT HAVING TO PAY A CLUB could FEE TO DO IT. EACH RESTAURANT WOULD COST $1.5 to $2 MILLION TO BUILD AND WOULD EMPLOY 50 to 100 PEOPLE. OBVIOUSLY THAT WOULD ULTIMATELY RESULT IN MORE TAX REVENUE FOR THE STATE, AND BETTER SERVICES FOR OUR CITIZENS.

WHETHER WE WANT TO ADMIT IT OR NOT, SMALL THINGS AFFECT PEOPLE'S PERCEPTIONS, AND OUR LIQUOR LAWS STEREOTYPE US AS BACKWARDS. OUTSIDERS THINK THAT BECAUSE WE'RE BACKWARDS IN OUR LIQUOR LAWS, WE ARE IN OTHER WAYS AS WELL. WE IN KANSAS KNOW THAT IS NOT TRUE, BUT I'VE HEARD IT, AND I'M SURE ~~MANY OF~~ YOU HAVE AS WELL.

IN THE PAST FEW YEARS WE HAVE MODERNIZED OUR THINKING AND OUR LAWS IN MANY AREAS. ADOPTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PERMITTING LIQUOR BY THE DRINK IS ANOTHER STEP NECESSARY TO SHOW THAT WE ARE PROGRESSIVE. IN TERMS OF THE RESTAURANT INDUSTRY, CONVENTION BUSINESS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RESORT ON ANY ONE OF OUR SEVERAL ~~BEAUTIFUL~~ major LAKES, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, IN GENERAL, LIQUOR BY THE DRINK IS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE.

IT IS TIME, WE AS KANSANS, DISPLAY A TRAIT FOR WHICH WE ARE OFTEN PRAISED, AND THAT IS HONESTY. LET US BE HONEST ABOUT LIQUOR

AND LIQUOR LAWS TO OURSELVES AND TO OUTSIDERS. LET US ADMIT THAT DEMON RUM IS SOMETHING THAT DOES NOT HAVE TO BE A DEMON WHEN PEOPLE ARE RESPONSIBLE ABOUT ITS USE. KANSANS HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE WHEN LIQUOR LAWS WERE LIBERALIZED IN THE PAST. LET US SHOW THE REST OF THE WORLD THAT WE WELCOME THEM WITH THE SAME SET OF RULES WE HAVE FOR OUR OWN CITIZENS.

AT THE SAME TIME, LET US USE OUR RESOURCES TO FIND THOSE WHO DRINK AND DRIVE. LET US EDUCATE OUR CITIZENS, ESPECIALLY OUR YOUTH, ABOUT THE DANGERS OF ABUSING ALCOHOL, AND LET US SEARCH FOR NEW WAYS TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM DRINKER.

I TRUST KANSANS TO USE THE RIGHT TO PURCHASE LIQUOR BY THE DRINK RESPONSIBLY, AND PERHAPS THE BOTTOM LINE IS NOT JUST ONE OF ECONOMICS BUT ONE OF TRUST IN OUR CITIZENS.

one vote

CAN MAKE THE DIFFERENCE

In 1970, the last time Kansans were allowed to vote on liquor by the drink, it failed by fewer than 12,000 votes statewide. Yet 63,673 voters who went to the polls in 1970 didn't bother to vote on the issue one way or the other!

On November 4th, you have the opportunity to make your voice heard. Liquor by the drink must pass by a majority statewide, and simultaneously by a majority in your county. So every vote counts, not only in Kansas, but in your county too.

In 1970, a single vote per polling booth could have made the difference. This year, be sure and vote. Your one vote can make the difference for Kansas.

yes. Question 2.

yes. Liquor by the Drink.

yes. Kansas.

update our state

"Updating our liquor laws on paper to match what already exists in reality will give positive signals to those businesses and individuals considering Kansas, and will help Kansas to prosper and progress rather than stagnate and decline."

Governor John Carlin
August, 1985

In 1986, you have the opportunity to eliminate the single most negative issue influencing how others perceive Kansas by voting yes on Question 2.

The club card system not only confuses visitors to Kansas, it discourages their presence. Kansans can and do have access to clubs. All others do not. This unfair system doesn't fit with the warm, friendly image projected by the citizens of our state.

If we are to welcome business, industry and tourists to our state, we must first prepare the way. And with states all around us competing for the same business, we must be on an equal footing.

Updated liquor laws will send a strong message. Kansas is progressive. Kansas is committed to a higher quality of life. And Kansas welcomes you.

consumption argument all wet

As our Southern neighbors have so recently proven, updated liquor laws do *not* mean increased consumption of alcohol.

In fact, since enacting liquor by the drink in Oklahoma a year ago, liquor sales have *dropped* an impressive 12.8%.

Kansas is now one of only three states in the country with prohibition-style club laws in force statewide. And as Oklahoma so recently demonstrated, the arguments against liquor by the drink are out-of-date.

"Increased consumption that we expected and anticipated hasn't come to pass yet. I'm glad to be proved wrong this far."

Richard McCartney
Oklahoma opponent / Liquor by the Drink
August, 1986

VOTE YES on Question 2.

DO YOU KNOW:

- Kansans last voted on liquor-by-the-drink in 1970 (14 years ago)
- It will probably be 1986 before we may again vote on liquor-by-the-drink in Kansas
- Kansas is one of only three states not to have liquor-by-the-drink
- It will require two-thirds of each house of the Kansas legislature (House, Senate) to place liquor-by-the-drink on the ballot
- The **1985** legislative session is the **next opportunity** to convince our legislature we should be allowed to vote on this issue
- Most likely, 1986 is the soonest **we** will have the opportunity to vote on this issue **if, and only if,** two-thirds of the legislature in the 1985 session vote favorably to give us the right to vote
- Our legislators need to know our support
- The right for us to vote has been endorsed by the Kansas Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the AFL-CIO, the Kansas Lodging Association, Governor Carlin, the League of Municipalities, Kansans for Effective Liquor Control and many other groups and individuals.

Please join us in letting our legislators know we want to vote.

YOU MUST BE REGISTERED TO VOTE IF YOU SIGN THIS PETITION.

VOLUNTEERS AND CONTRIBUTIONS ARE NEEDED.

For every $5 contribution we **can** deliver our message to 10 people.
Please send your contribution to Kansans for Effective Liquor Control

P.O. Box 2144
Topeka, KANSAS 66601

913-232-0890

Do You
Want to Wait Until
2001
to Vote Again on Liquor by the Drink?
It's been 16 years since Kansans last voted on Liquor by the Drink. The issue lost by less than 2%.
The Dry Forces will vote. If you don't vote on November 4th, it could be another 16 years (and the 21st Century) before you get the chance to vote again.
REGISTER TO VOTE YES
ON LIQUOR BY THE DRINK - NOVEMBER 4TH
Support Liquor by the Drink. Send your contribution to:
Kansans for Effective Liquor Control, P.O. Box 2144, Topeka, KS 66601
X
Vote Yes

Item Liquor by the Drink ... 1 ... :30

Title One Vote Can Make the Difference

	Audio
Black Screen	In 1970, just like today, the majority of Kansans favored liquor by the drink. In 1970, just like today, the majority of Kansans favored progress for our state.
Slowly, light fades up on polling booth, open but empty...	Yet in 1970, minority interests defeated Liquor by the Drink. A single vote per polling booth could have made the difference.
curtain closes with SPX and bright light comes on inside.	In 1986, you can be the Kansan who makes the difference for Liquor by the Drink... (SPX polling leve if you vote.
Fade to black, then bright white letters (YES) on black come up.	
YES.- Question 1	YES. Liquor by the Drink.
YES. Kansas.	YES. Kansas.



yes

Question 2.

yes

Liquor by the Drink

yes

Kansas.